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COMMENTS
LOOKING THROUGH FORM TO SUBSTANCE:
ARE MONTANA RESORT CONDOMINIUMS "SECURITIES"?
Gerald B. Murphy
William T. Wagner
The determination of whether or not a particular transaction constitutes a "security" is vital to the operation and effect of securities
legislation. In response to the expanding reach of such legislation
into hitherto untouched areas, the authors have chosen to examine
the historical development of the meaning of the term "security".
After submitting that the definition's evolution has resulted in trans-

actional and jurisdictional inconsistencies, they focus upon application of securities legislation to condominium projects. The authors

conclude by submitting that condominiums in Montana should not be
regulated as securities, due primarily to the objectives of securities
legislation and the existence of viable alternate regulation at the
state and federal levels.
INTRODUCTION

The scope of securities legislation and the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission is limited by the statutory definition
of a security. The definition section of the Securities Act of 1933,'
representative of most federal and state acts,2 defines a security first
by listing a number of fairly specific types of devices and arrangements,
and then by including a group of more general classifications.3
Since Congress chose to merely identify types of securities and
failed to establish any standards for applying the definition, the courts
have been forced to develop their own criteria for determining whether
a transaction constitutes a security.
Any tracing of the historical development of the meaning of the
term "security" must therefore begin with an examination of judicial
attempts at developing such viable criteria. As will be shown, the invention of novel investment schemes has proved that any definition of a
security must necessarily possess flexibility sufficient to allow the inter'Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(16) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(35) (1970); Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(17) (1970); REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 15-2004(11)
(1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
8Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) defines a "security"
as:
... [A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferrable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
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vention of the SEC into those areas at which securities legislation is
aimed.
HISTORY
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANTNG OF A "SEcuRITy"

State courts began interpreting state securities legislation in the
early 1900's and their interpretations were to have a pronounced influence
upon subsequent attempts by the United States Supreme Court to define
a security transaction. These state statutes were termed "Blue Sky
Laws" because their provisions were aimed at regulating speculative
schemes that had no more basis than so many feet of blue sky.4 They
were intended to stop the sales of shares in visionary oil wells, nonexistent gold mines, and other "get-rich-quick" schemes calculated to
separate credulous investors from their savings. The same theme underlies the federal securities legislation; the United States Supreme Court
was not reluctant to draw upon state court interpretations of "Blue
Sky Laws."
In 1920, the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled in State v. Gopher
Tire & Rubber Co.6 that where a corporation issued and sold certificates,
whereby a purchaser would share in the profits if he paid a certain
sum and assisted in promoting the sale of goods manufactured by the
corporation, the transaction was within the securities laws.7 In reaching this decision, the court issued a caveat to all subsequent courts interpreting securities laws:
To lay down a hard and fast rule by which to determine whether
that which is offered to a prospective investor is such a security
as may not be sold without a license would be to aid the unscrupulous
in circumventing the law.'
This theme was adopted by the United States Supreme Court twentythree years later in the first Supreme Court case to interpret the 1933
Act, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.9 In Joiner, the defendant had
engaged in a campaign to sell assignments of oil leases. The sales
brochure assured the prospective investor that the Joiner Corporation
was engaged in and would complete the drilling of a test well so located
as to test the oil-producing possibilities of the offered leaseholds. The
Court noted that defendants were not offering naked leasehold rights.
They offered a chance, without delay or additional cost, to share in
discovery values which might follow a current exploratory enterprise.
'State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920); Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917); State v. Agey, 171 N.C. 831, 88 S.E.
726, 729 (1916).
'State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 4 at 938.
6Id.
7
1d., where the court stated that an investment is " [t]he placing of capital or laying
out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment ....
8Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/4
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The undertaking to drill a well permeated the entire transaction. The
Court held this to be a security transaction which, since not registered,
was in violation of the 1933 Act.10 The Court stated that the documents
containing an offer of an economic interest in well-drilling operations
possessed all the evils inherent in a security transaction at which the
Securities Act of 1933 was aimed."
The Court evidenced the influence of the Gopher Tire rationale when
it stated:
The reach of the [1933] Act does not stop with the obvious and

commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they
appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as a matter of fact
that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of
dealing which established their character in commerce as 'investment contracts', or as 'any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security'."'
The Court emphasized the importance of looking through form to substance in determining the existence of a security.
Three years later in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,'5 Justice Murphy,
speaking for the Court, fashioned the so-called Howey test for determine
the existence of a security:
An 'investment contract' under the
transaction or scheme whereby a
common enterprise and is led to
efforts of the promoter or a third

Securities Act means a contract,
person invests his money in a
expect profits solely from the
party."

The Court in stating this test appeared to be attempting to reformulate
the test that had been applied in Gopher Tire,' Joiner,16 and numerous
lower federal court decisions.' 7 However, by placing the word "solely"
into the third element of the test (that profits come solely from the
efforts of others) the Court added a troublesome element in its attempt
to state a comprehensive test. Although the Gopher Tire decision 8 was
cited by the Court as authority for the Howey test, it is interesting to
note that the Gopher Tire facts' 9 would not have fit a literal application
of the new test. In Gopher Tire, the solely from the efforts of others
requirement would not have been met since a certificate holder was
10M. at 351.

"Id. at 349.
2
1d. at 351.

1SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11Id. at 298-299.
"State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 4.
"*SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., supra note 9.
"Penfield Co. of California v. SEC, .143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944); Atherton v.. U.S.,
128 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1943); SEC v. Universal Service Ass'n., 106 F.2d 232 (7th
Cir. 1939); SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1937); SEC v. Bourbon
Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D.Ky. 1940); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647
(S.D.Fla. 1941); SEC v. Payne, 33 F..Supp. 988 (D.C.Mass. 1940); SEC v. Timetrust,
Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (D.C.Cal. 1939); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D.C.Minn.
1935).
"State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 4.
0Id. at 937-938.
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appointed an agent to assist sales by word of mouth and in other
ways.

20

It appears that the use of the word "solely" was prompted by the
factual situation facing the Court in Howey. 21 The Howey Company
offered each prospective customer, in the form of both a land sales
contract and a service contract, separately deeded groves of orange
trees. A purchaser was free to make arrangements for a service contract with other service companies regarding management of the groves
and marketing of the fruit. The company's brochure, however, encouraged the use of Howey-in-the-Hills, Inc., which was under the
management and control of the Howey Company, to manage the groves
and market the oranges with a pro-rata deduction for expenses and
fees. Without the consent of the company, the landowner or purchaser
had no right of entry to market the crop. 22 In contrast to the Gopher
Tire case, it can readily be seen that profits were in fact to come
solely from the efforts of others. The Court, however, warned against
a literal interpretation of its new test. The Court stated that the statutory aim of the Securities Act of 1933 embodied a "flexible rather than
a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of money
of others on the promise of profits."
Although the Court warned
against literal application of its formula, a number of courts have interpreted the word "solely" literally.24 The danger of a literal approach
can easily be seen because the Gopher Tire case would not have fit the
Howey test. This creates an illogical result because the Howey formula
25
was intended to be predicated upon the Gopher Tire rationale.
The Howey test assumed and maintained a controlling position in
the realm of securities litigation for many years. That position, however, was not to be a permanent one. Recently, numerous modifications
of the test's interpretation and application have served to deteriorate
its impact.
B.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In their attempts to keep pace with the ever-increasing variety
of schemes designed specifically to take advantage of the loophole
created by the Howey test's solely requirement, courts soon began to
realize the necessity of overcoming the burden imposed by that require-

mId.
"SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., mpra note 13 at 294-206.
"Id. at 296.
21d. at 299.
-Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969); Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Civ.App. 1970); Georgia Market
Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); Gallion v. Alabama
Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So.2d 841 (1968).
'SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra note 13 at 298-299.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/4
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ment. The California supreme court initiated the first significant departure from the literal Howey test by stating a test with a new focus
in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.20 In that case defendants
offered membership interests in an unconstructed country club as a
means of financing the construction costs for various club improvements.
Membership interests entitled the holders thereof to use the club's
facilities, but the membership application and the club's bylaws specifically provided that members would have no rights in the income or
assets of the club.
The Supreme Court of California upheld the contention of the California Commissioner of Corporations that these interests constituted
securities. 27 Since no efforts were required on the part of membership
interest holders, the court could have based its decision on a literal
application of the Howey formula. The court, however, avoided Howey
altogether. In its place, the court relied upon a novel "risk capital" test
to justify the finding of a security:
[Defendants] are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a
business for profit. . . . [O]nly because the purchaser risks his
capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that
the benefits of club membership will materialize .... [T]he [Corporate Securities] Act['s] objective is to afford those who risk their

capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital
in one form or another .... [P]roperly so, for otherwise it could too
easily be vitiated by inventive substitutes for conventional means of
raising risk capital.'
The "risk capital" test has received measureable acceptance. Two
1971 decisions specifically based their conclusions on that test, State
v. Consumer Business System, Inc.29 and State v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc.30 In the latter case, the Supreme Court of Hawaii took the opportunity to severely criticize the solely requirement of Howey when it
stated:
The primary weakness of the Howey formula is that it has led
courts to analyze investment projects mechanically, based on a
narrow concept of investor participation. Thus, courts become entrapped in polemics over the meaning of the word 'solely' and fail
to consider the more fundamental question whether the statutory
policy of affording. broad protection to investors should be applied,

even to those situations where an investor is not inactive, but participates to a limited degree in the operation of the business.'

Another example of open criticism of the Howey test occurred in
Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v. Fortson32 where the court advocated a
flexible interpretation of the Howey requirement that profits be de-

"Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal.2d 811, 361 P.2d 906 (1961).
wId. at 909.

"Id. at 908-909.
EState v. Consumer Business Systems, Inc., 5 Or.App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
'State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (S.Ct. Haw. 1971).
81Id. at 108.
'Georgia
Market Centers,
v. Fortson,
supra note1974
24.
Published
by ScholarWorks
atInc.
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rived solely from the efforts of others. The Supreme Court of Georgia
stated:
It is our opinion that the definition of an investment contract given
by the Supreme Court of the United States is a workable formula.
... However, we would not mean to infer that this definition should
be adhered to with such strictness that a mere token participation
in an enterprise by the person investing capital would prevent the
contract from being classed as a security.
Still other courts have expressed dissatisfaction with the results
of applying Howey's solely requirement. Recently, in Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., Inc.,3 4 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
Gopher Tire test 35 as the holding in Howey and thus avoided the solely
problem. The case involved the sale of short term notes with a maturity
of less than nine months. Though such notes are specifically excluded
from the definition of a security in the 1934 Act,"6 the defendants had
represented the notes as being open market paper. The court found
the notes to be securities on the basis of the Gopher Tire test, though it
cited Howey as its source.

37

It is noteworthy that amidst this anxiety shrouding the Howey test
that only one vastly different formula has been propounded to replace
it. Dissatisfied with the twenty-eight-year-old Howey test (then twenty
years old), Professor Ronald J. Coffey of Western Reserve University
formulated a policy-oriented test based upon "the essential economic
considerations underlying the 'security' concept." 38 Coffey's basic premise
is that if a transaction embodies conditions conducive to the potential
abuses at which securities legislation is aimed, then the existence of
certain identifiable characteristics of that transaction should necessitate
a court's holding that it involves a security. His result is principally an

mId. at 623.
"Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
"See test mentioned supra note 7.
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970).
87Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., supra note 34 at 1080. The SEC itself laid the
foundation for the Sanders approach. In a joint release issued in 1967, the Maryland
Division of Securities, the Virginia Division of Securities, the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia, and the SEC stated:
Under the Federal Securities Laws, an offering of limited partnership
interest and interest in joint or profit sharing real estate ventures generally
constitutes an offering of a 'profit sharing agreement' or an 'investment contract' which is a security' within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933. The Supreme Court has said that an 'investment contract' is a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party. [citing Howey]. In other words, the investor provides the capital
and shares the risk and the profits; the promoter or third party manages, operates and controls the enterprise, usually without active participation on the part
of the investor. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967) [1966-1967
77,462.
Transfer Binder] CCH FE_.SEc.L.RBP.
It is essential to note the absence of the word "solely".
"Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W.Ras.L.REv. 367 (1967).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/4
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extension of the "risk capital" test,3 9 in that his formula focuses upon
the existence of any significant risk to one's initial investment.
Introducing his test as one which would allow a court to "distinguish a security from the generality of transactions so as to create a
need for the liberal procedures, protections and remedies provided by
the securities laws against fraud and half-truths", 40 Coffey's formula
assumed the following form:
A 'security' is:
(1) A transaction in which
(2) a person ('buyer') furnishes value ('initial value') to another
('seller'); and
(3) a portion of initial value is subjected to the risks of an enterprise. it being sufficient if(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprietary interest
in, or debt-holder claim against, the enterprise, or
(b) any property received by the buyer is committed to use by
the enterprise, even though the buyer retains specific ownership of such property, or
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose present
value is determined by taking into account the anticipated
but unrealized success of the enterprise, even though the
buyer has no legal relationships with the enterprise; and
(4) at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar with
the operations of the enterprise or does not receive the right
to participate in the management of the enterprise; and
(5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding
that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above initial
value, will accrue to the buyer as a result of the operation of
the enterprise."

Although prolifically cited and discussed, the Coffey formula has
not been overwhelmingly accepted. Courts continue to apply the Howey
43
42
test, either as originally stated or as modified by various jurisdictions.
Two final developments regarding the definition of a security must
be noted in order to appreciate the current scope of SEC involvement.
The first concerns a 1971 SEC release in which the Commission explicitly
denounced blind adherence to a literal application of the Howey formula. Perhaps influenced by the numerous judicial modifications of that
formula, the SEC stated:
It must be emphasized that the assignment of nominal or limited
responsibilities to the participant does not negative the existence of
an investment contract; where the duties assigned are so narrowly
circumscribed as to involve little real choice of action or where the
duties assigned would in any event have little direct effect upon
receipt by the participant of the benefits promised by the promoters,
a security may be found to exist. As the Supreme Court has held,
emphasis must be placed upon economic reality. [citing Howey]"
BDiscussed supra notes 28-30.
"Coffey, supra note 38 at 376.
"Id. at 377.
"See cases mentioned supra note 24.

"See cases mentioned supra notes 26, 29, 30, 32, 34.
"SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971) [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
COH FED. SEc.L.REP.

98,446.
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The second development is a recent Ninth Circuit decision, SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.45 There the court decided not to read
solely literally in order to find that a fraudulent scheme required registration. In Turner, the SEC had issued a preliminary injunction to prohibit the offering and selling of certain "Adventures" and "Plans" by
Dare To Be Great, Inc., a Florida corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. The question before the
court was whether the "Adventures" or "Plans" enjoined were "securities" within the meaning of the 1933 Act. There were two elements to
the "Adventures" or "Plans": (1) the purchaser was privileged to
attend seminar sessions and receive tapes, records and other material
aimed at improving self-motivation and sales ability; and (2) if he
purchased one of the more expensive "Adventures" or "Plans" he also
received the opportunity to help sell the courses to others. If successful,
the purchaser received part of the purchase price as a commission.
Once an individual had purchased an "Adventure" or "Plan", he turned
his efforts toward bringing others into the organization for which he
would receive a part of their financial contributions. A purchaser's task
was to bring prospective purchasers to "Adventure Meetings". 46 The
court held that this transaction was within the purview of the 1933
Act, quoting Techerepnin v. Knight47 where the Court stated: "In searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality. ' 48 The Turner court approached the definition of a
"security" with this admonition in mind.49 Based on the facts the court
stated that all the elements of the Howey test had been met save the
element requiring that profits come solely from the efforts of others.50
Because the scheme involved was, in the opinion of the court, obviously fraudulent, the court strained to find a security transaction. In
looking through form to substance, the court stated:
In light of the remedial nature of the legislation, the statutory

policy of affording broad protection to the public, and the Supreme
Court's admonitions that the definition of securities should be a flexible one, the word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal
limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather
must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition
those schemes which involve in substance, if not in form, securities.'

The court next noted that a strict interpretation of the Howey test had
met with criticism, citing State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.52 The
court rightly held that to apply a strict interpretation would allow un"SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 479.

' 7Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
"SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra note 45 at 481.
"Id.
"Id. at 481-482.
bId. at 482.

5"State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., supra note 30.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/4
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scrupulous enterpreneurs to avoid registration by simply adding a
requirement that the purchaser contribute a "modicum of effort. 5 8 To
have held otherwise the court would have allowed an obviously fraudulent scheme to continue.
The court's holding in Turner was not a major attempt to redefine
the essential nature of a security nor did it represent any real departure
from the Howey test. The court merely refused to apply dogmatically
54
the Howey test where it would have led to an unrealistic result.
The courts continue to struggle with the Howey test and undoubtedly
some will use the techniques discussed supra to avoid the unrealistic
results that a literal application may yield. When confronted with this
problem the courts should heed the directive of the Howey court and
look through form to substance.
APPLICATION OF SECURITIES LAW TO CONDOMINIUMS
A.

DEVELOPMENT

Tax advantages and utilization of management services have contributed to the increased popularity of both residential and resort condominiums. 55 Accompanying this development is a growing trend toward
the renting of non-owner occupied units, particularly as to resort condominiums. Since this trend embodies investment characteristics, it has
drawn the attention of the SEC.
The Commission early found that where condominiums were sold
in connection with a "rental pooling agreement ' 5 6 the transaction would
require registration under the Securities Act of 1933. 5 7 Developers
sought to avoid registration due to the expense and time involved and
were successful in many instances by avoiding any mention of a pooling
arrangement. 58
3SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra note 45 at 482.
"Id. at 483; accord, Mitaner v. Cardet International, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 12641268 (N.D.Ill. 1973).
1"... [A]n ever-increasing share of the condominium market is being taken up by
leisure-oriented developments, located predominantly in ski areas and traditional
vacation states . . ." [such as Montana]. Bohan, The Securities Law Implications of
Condominium Marketing Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool,
2 CoNN.L.Rv. 1 (1969).
"A "rental pooling agreement" typically provides for the pooling of all rental
income which is distributed on a prescribed basis, notwithstanding the fact that
some units remain vacant.
"SEC No-Action Letter, In re Edward S. Jaffry (Aug. 25, 1971) [1971-1972 Transfer
78,395; SEC No-Action Letter, In re San DiegoBinder] CCH FE_.SEC.L.R.P.
Maui Group (Sept. 7, 1971) [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCII FED.SEc.L.REP.
78,444.
5SEC No-Action Letter, In re Clemson Properties, Inc. (Aug. 13, 1971) [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED.Szc.L.REP.
78,387; SEC No-Action Letter, In re
Surftides Condominiums (Jan. 7, 1972) [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FE4.SEc.
78,686; SEC No-Action Letter, In re The Innisfree Corp. (Ap. 5, 1973)
L.REv.
79,398; SEC No-Action Letter, In re
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn.Sm.L.REv.
Culverhouse, Tomlinson, Mills, DeCarion & Anderson (Oct. 5, 1973) [Current Binder]
79,612.
CCH FED.SEc.L.REP.
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Divergent rulings on the subject of whether or not certain rental
agreements were within the purview of the 1933 Act prompted the Commission to issue Securities Act Release No. 33-5347 in 1973.59 The stated
purpose of the release was to alert developers engaged in building and
selling condominiums of their responsibilities under securities legislation.
The SEC noted that recent interpretations of the Howey test had indicated
that the expected return to investors need not be solely from the efforts
of others. For this reason, the Commission stated that an investment
contract could be present in situations where an investor was not
wholly inactive, but even participated to a limited degree in the operation of the business. Although the Commission noted the fact that
recent decisions had modified the solely requirement, it returned to the
traditional Howey test when it stated:
Condominiums, coupled with a rental agreement will be deemed to be
securities if they are offered and sold through advertising, sales
literature, promotional schemes or oral representations which emphasize the economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter, in renting the units.'
The Commission then set forth its guidelines. It decided that the
offering of condominium units in conjunction with any one of the following would cause the offering to be regarded as the offering of a
security in the form of an investment contract:
(1) The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other similar service, are offered and sold with emphasis on the economic
benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial

efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or arranged

for by the promoter, from rental of the units;
(2) The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement; and
(3) The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the
purchaser must hold his unit available for rental for any part
of the year, must use an exclusive rental agent or his otherwise
materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his unit.'
The Commission further stated that an owner of a condominium
may, without registering, enter into a non-pooled rental arrangement
62
with an agent not required to be used as a condition to the purchase.
Furthermore, a continuing affiliation between the project developers
or promoters and the project by reason of maintenance arrangements
3
will not, in the opinion of the SEC make the unit a security.
In direct contrast with the joint release issued in 1967 where the
solely requirement was deleted,6 4 the guidelines contained in SEC Release No. 33-5347 clearly revitalize that requirement of the Howey formula. Under its newly promulgated guidelines, the SEC will require

5SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347 (Jan. 4, 1973).
G0Id.
61
1d.

"Id. (whether or not the agent is affiliated with the offeror).
GId.

"SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877, supra note 37.
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registration of an offering only if a prospective purchaser must enter
into a rental pooling agreement whereby his return will be earned solely
through the efforts of others. Registration is not required, however, if
the purchaser's return on his investment is to be realized by his own
efforts. The SEC will not intervene if the purchaser either rents his
unit himself or has the option of choosing a rental agency, whether or
not independent of the developer-offeror. The effect of this revitalization
of the solely requirement is to allow a developer to circumvent SEC
regulation by allowing the purchaser to participate in rental arrangements. Such an effect leads to unrealistic results since the substance
of a transaction should prevail over its form.
B.

EVALUATION OF THE

SEC's

POSITION

The guidelines set forth in SEC Release No. 33-5347 are misdirected
for three principal reasons. First, the guidelines are not indicative of,
nor responsive to, the overall objectives of securities legislation. Second,
no consideration is given to the fact that transactions which meet the
prescribed guidelines may already be regulated by alternate agencies.
Third, application of the guidelines to condominium projects serves to
reaffirm the solely requirement of the Howey test.
1.

Objectives of Security Legislation

The overriding objective of securities law is the protection of in65
provides
vestors. In seeking to attain this objective, the 1933 Act
for full and fair disclosure of all material facts to investors in connection
with distributions of securities by issuers. The 1933 Act, remedial legislation requiring liberal interpretation,66 was designed to "promote full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions. '6 7 Therefore, the existence of a security, assuming no exemptions are available, requires registration with the SEC. The registration
process serves only to inform the investor about the offeror's status;
the critical investment choice remains with the investor.
In light of these statutory objectives, it appears that the SEC's
condominium guidelines are misdirected. Because of the effect of viable
alternate regulatory provisions, no meaningful distinctions as to the
necessity of protecting prospective condominium purchasers can be
drawn between the following examples: (1) where the purchaser is
required to participate in a rental pooling arrangement operated by a
developer, and (2) where the purchaser may rent the unit himself
or employ the services of an independent rental agency.

6Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g
"Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra note 47 at
'-SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
Couer D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S.

(1970).
336.
119, 124 (1952), citing A. C. Frost & Co. v.
38, 40 (1941).
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Alternative Regulation

In the realm of condominium developments, there exists legislation
which serves to perform the function of the SEC-namely, the protection of the investor. In Montana, the Unit Ownership Act 8 vests
the Department of Business Regulation with the task of regulating condominium projects.
Beginning with a comprehensive definition section,6 9 the Act provides for protective disclosure requirements. The following eight provisions are posited as being representative of the type of extensive protective mechanisms which serve to fulfill objectives parallel to securities
legislation:
(1) In order to comply with the provisions of the Act, the owners or
lessees must execute, acknowledge and record a declaration. Prior to
recording the instrument with the county clerk and recorder, it
must be approved by the Department of Revenue. Approval of a
declaration, the elements of which are set forth in R.C.M. 1947, §§
67-2314(1)-(8), requires that all state taxes and assessments have
70
been paid.
(2) Floor plans of the building(s) described in a declaration must be
recorded simultaneously with the declaration. The plans must be
certified by a registered architect or a registered professional engineer. 71 A 1973 amendment to the Act provides for the refund of
purchasers' funds if there are any unapproved alterations in these
72
plans.
(3) Of units are conveyed or leased prior to completion of the building's construction, R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2303.1 requires that all moneys
from the sale or lease of the units are to be placed in an escrow
account. No disbursements may be made from such fund until completion of the building and all common elements or until compliance
with provisions (4) and (5).
(4) In order to use purchasers' funds for the construction costs of the
condominium project, a developer must file a written notice of
intention to sell with the Department of Business Regulation. Such

-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 67-2301-2344.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2302. The following definitions are especially significant:
(5)
'Condominium"
means the ownership of single units with common elements located on property submitted to the provisions of sections 67-2301
to 67-2342.
(12)
''Project" means a real estate condominium project; a plan whereby a
condominium of two (2) or more units located on property submitted to
the provisions of 67-2302 to 67-2342, are offered or proposed to be offered
for sale.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2317(1), (2).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2319.
UR.C.M. 1947, § 67-2303.4(1).
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notice shall "fully disclose all material facts on a form prescribed
by the department."7 3
(5) After receipt of an intention to sell, the department shall inspect
the project and examine the accounts and records of the developer.
A report of its inspection shall be on file and available for public
inspection in the office of the director of the department. 74 After
the filing of the inspection report and the recording of the declaration, the department shall issue its final report based upon the
above data and six essential disclosure provisions. 75 If after the
issuance of a final report, any circumstances occur which would
render the report misleading as to purchasers or if the developer
proposes to materially change the project, R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2305.5 (2)
provides that sales shall be halted until the department has been
furnished with sufficient information to issue a supplementary
report.
(6) A developer may not enter into a binding contract for the sale
or lease of a unit until:
(a) the department's final report (and all supplementary reports,
if any) have been given to the purchaser;
(b) a prospective purchaser has been given the opportunity to read
the report(s); and
(c) a prospective purchaser has executed a receipt for the report(s).7 6
(7) The Act further provides for specific provisions which must be
77
included in a condominium deed or lease.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 2303.2(1), (2).
7'Id.

-R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2303.5(1) (a) requires that the following be filed with the department:
(i)
a verified statement showing all costs involved in completing the project,
including land, ground lease payments and equipment lease payments, real
property taxes, construction costs, architect, engineering, and attorneys fees,
financing costs, provisions for contingency, and other costs which must be
paid on or before the completion of construction of the building;
(ii)
a verified estimate of the time of completion of construction of the total
project;
(iii) satisfactory evidence of sufficient funds to cover the total project cost from
purchasers funds, equity funds, interim or permanent loan commitments, or
other sources;
(iv) a copy of the executed construction contract;
(v)
satisfactory evidence of a performance bond of not less than one hundred per
cent (100%) of the cost of construction with a reliabile surety company;
(vi) if purchasers funds are to be used for construction, an executed copy of the
escrow agreement for the escrow funds required under section 67-2303.1 for
financing construction.
7
6R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2303.6(1).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2322 provides that the deed or lease of a unit shall contain:
(1)
A description of the land, the name of the property, and the recording
index numbers and date of recording of the declaration.
(2) The unit designation of the unit.
(3)
The use for which the unit is intended.
(4) The percentages of undivided interest in the common elements appertaining
to the unit.
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(8) Lastly, R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2343 vests the Department of Business
Regulation with both investigative and injunctive powers in the
event the department has satisfactory evidence indicating that any
78
person has violated any provision of the Act.

Both the extensive disclosure requirements and the investigativeinjunctive powers granted the department serve to afford adequate
protection to potential purchasers of condominium units in Montana.
Comparable requirements at the federal level are contained in the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 79 the provisions of which may
also apply to condominium projects. In summary, there exist viable
alternative means of regulating the sale or lease of Montana resort condominiums. Compliance with the provisions of the Unit Ownership Act
appear to dispel the necessity of requiring duplicate, or even triplicate,
duties of disclosure.
C.

EROSION OF THE "SOLELY"

REQUIREMENT

As developed earlier, Howey's solely from the efforts of others requirement has been modified or ignored by numerous courts. Courts
have lessened its impact in order to supply needed protection to investors
in various transactions.
The new SEC condominium guidelines have resurrected and strengthened the solely requirement. A reversion to a strict application of that
requirement serves to defeat the intent of securities legislation. By
affording the condominium purchasers the opportunity to rent their units
themselves or to select independent rental agencies, developers will be
able to evade the consequences of SEC intervention. It appears that the
SEC has ignored the fact that any formula which purports to guide
courts in determining whether or not a particular transaction constitutes
a security should be broad and flexible enough to fulfill the remedial
purposes of security legislation.
CONCLUSION
With the resurrection of the solely requirement many courts will
continue to struggle with a literal application of the Howey test. Hopefully, most courts will seek to avoid unrealistic results and look through
form to substance. In any event Montana resort condominiums should
not be regulated as securities. The existence of alternate regulation
affording investors adequate protections precludes the necessity of SEC
involvement.

(5) Any further details the grantor and grantee or lessor and lessee may consider desirable.
7Furthemore, R.C.M. 1947, § 67-2344 provides that any person violating any provision of the Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than one

(1) year, or both.
7Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970).
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